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THIN SHIELDS PIERCE EASILY: A CASE FOR
FORTIFYING THE JOURNALISTS’ PRIVILEGE IN NEW
ZEALAND
Devin M. Smith†
Abstract: In late 2006, New Zealand’s Parliament inserted Section 68 into the
nation’s Evidence Act 2006, providing for the first time a testimonial privilege
specifically protecting journalists from compelled disclosure of their confidential sources.
The privilege, commonly referred to as a shield law, has been met with approval from
politicians, media commentators, and journalists, both in New Zealand and beyond.
While New Zealand’s reporter shield law goes a long way toward extending press
freedoms, it ultimately falls short of the country’s historically robust commitment to the
free flow of information. Section 68’s most glaring shortcoming is the ease with which a
judge can tear down its protections. A judicial determination that the public interest in
the disclosure of the source outweighs the public interest in maintaining confidentiality
will pierce the shield. Unfortunately, balancing tests such as the one codified in Section
68 have a track record of exploitation, often with fair trial concerns overriding free
expression.
In that light, Section 68 should be strengthened for three purposes: 1) to reflect the
nation’s longstanding commitment to a free and vibrant media, 2) to satisfy the
requirements of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and 3) to accord with effective
models from other democratic governments. Two relevant sources the country could
mine for guidance include United States federal law and the newly enacted shield law in
Washington State. New Zealand would be well served by observing not only the
protective innovations of the two models, but also their shortcomings. The federal status
quo in the U.S., should serve as a cautionary tale, both from policy and legal standpoints.
Washington State’s statute on the other hand, strikes an appropriate balance between the
public interest in disclosure and the public interest in protecting journalists’ sources.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 5, 1999, the front page of New Zealand’s Sunday
Star-Times served readers a juicy political scandal.1 In part delicious, in part
tragic, the scandal involved New Zealand Police Commissioner Peter
Doone’s conduct during a routine traffic stop. After playing in the press for
more than a month, the incident gained momentum on January 16, 2000,
when a confidential government source implicated Doone in obstructing a

†
J.D. expected 2009, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to thank
Peter Nicolas, the Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law at the University of Washington, for his
guidance. Also, this comment would not have been possible without the incessant nitpicking of the Pacific
Rim Law & Policy Journal’s editorial staff. Thank you too, Robin, for your support, patience, and good
humor.
1
Police Boss Was in Car Stopped by Constables, THE SUNDAY STAR-TIMES (Auckland), Dec. 5,
1999, at 1.
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breathalyzer test intended for the driver, Doone’s then-girlfriend.2 Despite
staunchly denying wrongdoing, Doone resigned shortly thereafter.3
The imbroglio started on election night, November 27, 1999. Just
after nine o’clock, a rookie constable pulled over a 1999 Nissan Maxima
driven by Robyn Johnstone 4 for operating without activated headlights. 5
The police commissioner sat in the front passenger seat. 6 Quoting an
unidentified source, the Sunday Star-Times alleged that Doone exited the car
and engaged rookie constable Brett Main as the constable approached the
Maxima.7 Main had been on the job three days.8 The article quoted Doone
as uttering four fateful words: “That won’t be necessary,” when the rookie
indicated he should perform a breathalyzer test on Johnstone.9 Although the
rookie cop had the “alcohol sniffer” in hand, he never administered the
test.10
On January 14, 2000, Sunday Star-Times reporter Oskar Alley
telephoned New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark to inquire about the
incident (he had initially learned of it from police sources).11 The Prime
Minister confirmed, under a presumption of confidentiality, 12 that Doone
used the infamous four words. 13 The high-level, yet anonymous, 14
confirmation assured the scoop a prominent front-page splash on January 16,
2000.15
As a result of the ensuing public outcry, Doone was forced to resign
later that month. 16 Police reports criticized Doone for approaching the
2
Oskar Alley, Doone Case Cop Was Ready to Breath Test, THE SUNDAY STAR-TIMES (Auckland),
Jan. 16, 2000, at 1.
3
Vernon Small, Unrepentant Doone Forced to Step Down, THE N.Z. HERALD, Jan. 26, 2000,
available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=114200.
4
Johntone, who was Doone’s girlfriend at the time, is now his wife. See Leah Haines, Doones:
Why We’re Taking on Helen Clark, THE N.Z. HERALD, May 1, 2005, available at
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10123168.
5
Helen Tunnah, PM to Fight Defamation Claim, THE N.Z. HERALD, Apr. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/litigation/news/article.cfm?c_id=249&objectid=10122718.
6
Alley, supra note 2.
7
Id.
8
Tunnah, supra note 5.
9
Alley, supra note 2.
10
Haines, supra note 4.
11
Press Release, ACT political party, Did Prime Minister Helen Clark Treat Police Commissioner
Peter Doone with Honesty and Integrity? (May 10, 2005), available at http://www.act.org.nz/node/26929#.
12
Editorial, Doone Affair Puts All in a Poor Light, THE N.Z. HERALD, May 4, 2005, available at
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=240&objectid=10123643.
13
Id.
14
The article referred to Prime Minister Clark as a “source” and a “source close to the inquiry.”
Alley, supra note 2.
15
Id.
16
Small, supra note 3.
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officer, but also found that Doone never used the phrase “that won’t be
necessary.”17
Five years passed before Doone sued the Sunday Star-Times for
defamation, claiming $850,000 (NZD) in damages.18 During the legal battle
between Doone and the newspaper, court documents filed by Clark 19
revealed that the Prime Minister had served as the confidential source of the
newspaper’s information. 20 On April 27, 2005, Doone dropped his suit
against the Sunday Star-Times and set his legal energies against the Prime
Minister.21
While New Zealand legislators had been contemplating a journalists’
privilege for more than a decade,22 few could have guessed a routine traffic
stop would become the catalyst for codifying one. The outing of the Prime
Minister as the source of the Sunday Star-Times’ story humiliated Prime
Minister Clark and her government.23 The ensuing uproar, fueled by the
Prime Minister’s comments that government officials would curtail
conversations with reporters if their identities could not be protected,24 gave
momentum to a reporter shield law. 25 Accordingly, Parliament inserted
Section 68 (hereinafter “§ 68”) into the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006,
providing a qualified privilege for journalists to maintain the confidentiality
of their sources.26
This comment examines the scope of protection provided by New
Zealand’s journalists’ privilege. Part II explores New Zealand’s historical
17
An internal report conducted by then Deputy Police Commissioner Rob Robinson, Doone’s righthand man, called Doone’s actions “inappropriate.” Tunnah, supra note 5. The Sunday Star-Times printed a
correction on June 4, 2000: “The Sunday Star-Times, having recently received further information, now
acknowledges that Peter Doone did not make that statement. We regret our error and apologise to former
commissioner Doone.” Alley, supra note 2.
18
Kevin List, Fairfax Makes PM an Offer She Can’t Refuse: How the Prime Minister and APN
Employees Came to be Defending Fairfax, SCOOP INDEPENDENT NEWS, May 10, 2005,
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0505/S00117.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
19
Clark did not admit her involvement voluntarily. The Sunday Star-Times’s publisher, Fairfax New
Zealand, subpoeanaed Clark to provide a brief of evidence to help defend against Doone’s lawsuit. Id. See
also Tunnah, supra note 5. Fairfax was roundly criticized for breaching its journalistic and ethical duties to
protect confidential sources. Doone Affair Puts All in a Poor Light, supra note 12.
20
Tunnah, supra note 5.
21
Id.
22
New Zealand Law Commission, Preliminary Paper No. 23: Evidence Law: Privilege, May 1994,
¶ 348.
23
Doone Affair Puts All in a Poor Light, supra note 12. The opposition party even called on her to
resign. See 625 PARL. DEB., H.R. (May 10, 2005) 20360.
24
Doone Affair Puts All in a Poor Light, supra note 12.
25
See Media Law Update, Bell Gully, Journalists’ Sources—Protection in the Spotlight? (Aug.
2005) (on file with Bell Gully), available at http://www.bellgully.co.nz/newsletters/01Media/
journalistic_protection.asp.
26
Helen Tunnah, Journalists Get Protection, THE N.Z. HERALD, May 28, 2005. See Media Law
Update, supra note 25.
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commitment to the free flow of information to provide context for the
passage of § 68. Part III features an in-depth look at the strengths and
weaknesses of § 68, including a comparison of § 68 to New Zealand
common law confidential-source protections, Section 14 of the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990, and general free-press ideals. Part IV contrasts § 68
with shield laws in other jurisdictions, including United States federal law
and the new journalists’ privilege in Washington State. Finally, Part V
recommends specific changes to § 68 that would make it a robust, suitable,
and effective shield law.
II.

NEW ZEALAND’S HISTORICAL COMMITMENT TO
INFORMATION IS ENERGETIC AND ESTABLISHED

A.

Protecting Reporter-Source Confidentiality Is Essential to a Vibrant
and Effective Media and, by Extension, a Functional Democracy in
New Zealand

THE

FREE FLOW

OF

Confidential sources are key ingredients to an effective free press.
Journalists cannot fulfill one of their primary purposes—the role of
government watchdog—without cultivating and maintaining confidences. In
Goodwin v. United Kingdom,27 a case heard before the European Court of
Human Rights in 1996, the court elucidated the need for confidential sources
in free society:
[F]reedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society and . . . the safeguards to be
afforded to the press are of particular importance. Protection of
journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press
freedom . . . . Without such protection, sources may be deterred
from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of
public interest. 28
The deterrence described in Goodwin is of particular concern to journalists.
Forced disclosure of confidential sources has a so-called chilling effect on
the free flow of information.29 Specifically, compelled disclosure severs the
media’s ability to acquire information, which, in turn, strangles a modern,
informed, and democratic citizenry. Many chilling-effect analyses proffer
27

Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123 (1996).
Id. at 143.
29
See Janice Brabyn, Protection against Judicially Compelled Disclosure of the Identity of News
Gatherers’ Confidential Sources in Common Law Jurisdictions, 69(6) MO. L. REV. 895, 922 (Nov. 2006);
see Goodwin, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 143; see also B.D. Gray, Journalists Compelled to be Witnesses—Time
for a Re-Evaluation, 2006 N.Z. L. REV. 443, 444 (2006).
28
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three concerns: 1) current or potential sources will dry up as a result of
routine compelled disclosure; 2) journalists themselves will face increased
personal harm through violence and intimidation if sources realize
journalists can be compelled to testify as to events they observe.30 Said
another way, if sources come to believe they have to cover up conversations
they have had with reporters, they may resort to desperate measures; and
3) compelled disclosure infringes upon the autonomy of media outlets to
dictate their own news coverage.31
Of the three prongs, the “drying up” of sources due to routine
compelled disclosure has particularly troubling consequences to the free
flow of information. One commentator described the phenomenon as
follows: “[g]eneral or specific knowledge amongst potential sources that
news gatherers can be compelled to disclose their identities in court . . . will
have a strong chilling effect upon some people who might otherwise be
willing or persuaded to be confidential sources in the future.”32
As a case in point, after her involvement in the Doone affair, Prime
Minister Clark expressed a disinclination to speak with journalists. “There
was a time when I used to pick up journalists’ phone calls; that time is
largely now gone. One does learn from those experiences,” Clark said.33 It
would be hard to argue that the citizens of New Zealand are not adversely
affected by their Prime Minister’s reluctance to speak to them via the press.
In light of these considerations, many media commentators and media
organizations argue the professional and ethical obligation to protect source
confidentiality is sacrosanct. The American Society of Newspaper Editors
guidelines note that “[p]ledges of confidentiality to news sources must be
honored at all costs . . . .”34 New Zealand press commentators have noted:
“Journalists . . . have an obligation to protect [sources] when necessary. The
generally accepted practice is to refuse to identify the identity of a source,”35
even if it leads to contempt of court. The 1999 New Zealand Press Council’s
Statement of Principles suggests that editors and journalists “have a strong
obligation to protect against disclosure of the identity of confidential
sources.” 36 Perhaps due to the position taken by journalists, in 1994 the
30

Gray, supra note 29, at 444.
Id.
32
Brabyn, supra note 29, at 922.
33
625 PARL. DEB., H.R. (May 10, 2005), 20361.
34
American Society of Newspaper Editors, ASNE Statement of Principles, Article VI, Nov. 29,
2006, http://www.asne.org//index.cfm?ID=888 (last visited Sept. 10, 2008) (emphasis added).
35
John Tidey, Well-informed Sources, in WHAT’S NEWS: RECLAIMING JOURNALISM IN NEW
ZEALAND 72, 78 (Judy McGregor & Margie Comrie eds., Dunmore Press 2002).
36
Jim Tully & Nadia Elsaka, Ethical Codes and Credibility: The Challenge to Industry, in WHAT’S
NEWS: RECLAIMING JOURNALISM IN NEW ZEALAND 142, 154 (Judy McGregor & Margie Comrie eds.,
31
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New Zealand Law Commission concluded that a journalists’ privilege would
serve “the wider interest of society better than if no privilege were
accorded.”37
From United States lore, the most celebrated confidential source is
Deep Throat. Now exposed to be former Federal Bureau of Investigation
Associate Director W. Mark Felt,38 Deep Throat helped undo the presidency
of Richard Nixon following a 1972 burglary at the Watergate complex.39
“This is a case history and a case lesson of why it is so important that we
have confidential sources,” said Carl Bernstein who, along with fellow
Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, broke the Watergate story. “If
you were to look back at the original stories, I think hardly any of them had
named sources. There’s no way this reporting could have been done, nor is
there any way that good reporting at a lot of places can be done, without
anonymous sources.” 40 Felt was willing to collaborate with Woodward
because he felt confident the reporter would go to jail before revealing Felt
as the source of information.41 In fact, Felt’s identity remained the best-kept
secret in American journalism for more than three decades, until he divulged
his own involvement in 2005.42
In the Doone affair, it remains unclear whether Prime Minister Clark
made an honest mistake, received bad information, or intentionally lied
when she told the newspaper Doone intervened in the breath test. Of those
possibilities, the third would most complicate the argument in favor of a
shield law. Namely, some journalists suggest that when a confidential
source knowingly provides false information to the media—often for
character assassination or other self-serving purpose—the source’s lie
destroys the pledge of nondisclosure.
However, this comment operates under the principle that even in the
case of intentional falsehood, the journalist and the courts should not divulge
the source’s identity. If New Zealand courts do not protect sources deemed
to be liars, sources with legitimate, accurate, and important information
might not step forward—this is the chilling effect. Failure to protect
Dunmore Press 2002) (quoting the New Zealand Press Council, Statement of Principles, 1999. The 2008
principles are available at http://www.presscouncil.org.nz/principles_2.html).
37
New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 22, ¶ 334.
38
Todd S. Purdum, “Deep Throat” Unmasks Himself as Ex-No. 2 at F.B.I., THE N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 1,
2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/01/politics/01throat.html?_r=sq.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See generally BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Simon &
Schuster 1974); KATHARINE GRAHAM, PERSONAL HISTORY 472, 483 (Alfred A. Knopf 1997); BEN
BRADLEE, A GOOD LIFE: NEWSPAPERING AND OTHER ADVENTURES 365 (Simon & Schuster 1995).
42
Purdum, supra note 38.
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apparent liars would force sources to develop ironclad evidence to support
their information, particularly in the case where an opposing side could be
expected to voice vehement opposition, denials, or outright lies. Often,
sources cannot garner this type of evidence without risking personal or
professional injury. If courts put honest sources at the risk of being treated
like unprotected liars, the honest sources will be less willing to contact
journalists.
One of America’s preeminent First Amendment lawyers, Floyd
Abrams, recently said,
[T]he law can’t and shouldn’t distinguish, and I would say
journalists can’t and shouldn’t distinguish between good
sources and bad, virtuous sources and unvirtuous ones. If a
journalist grants confidentiality, I think the journalist has to
keep her word . . . . [I]t seems to me very important for the
credibility of all journalists and for the general free flow of
information to come to the public for journalists who, having
once promised confidentiality, keep their word about it.43
Because journalists rarely witness important events firsthand, they must rely
on sources for information. Even the best journalistic instincts cannot
always differentiate truth from falsity. When a damning bit of confidential
info comes across a journalist’s desk, corroboration by a second, trusted
(hopefully on-the-record) source often provides a layer of trustworthiness.
Unfortunately, “true” stories and “accurate” reports are not always the same.
Sources often misspeak, exaggerate, or lie. Journalists should strive for
truth, but when truth proves elusive, the best journalists can do is accurately
report the source’s information. In this light, how can the law expect
journalists to know who is lying and who is not? Permitting disclosure for
lying confidential sources puts journalists in the position of making that
unknowable call.
Instead, the only feasible solution is a shield law that includes
protection even for potentially untruthful sources. When a source’s story
checks out, it should be printed. When it turns out later that a source lied,
printing a correction and then aggressively reporting on the lie itself corrects
the initial error. This method preserves confidentiality, avoids the chilling
effect, and fully informs the public.
Prime Minister Clark might have lied. Even if she did, the follow-up
stories and intense media scrutiny uncovered her role in the affair more
43
Frontline: Interview Floyd Abrams, (PBS television broadcast July 10, 2006), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/abrams.html.
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effectively, thoroughly, and responsibly than compelled disclosure would
have—all while maintaining the free flow of information.44
B.

New Zealand’s Press Has an Established and Colorful History of
Protecting Confidential Sources

New Zealand has long enjoyed a healthy commitment to press
freedoms, particularly the protection of confidential sources. Media
historians point to protection of anonymous authors and the difficulties faced
by reporters in maintaining those confidences45 since the inception of New
Zealand’s press in 1840.46
In 1894, the Evening Post obtained leaked documents regarding the
resignation of New Zealand’s military commander. The paper ran the story
prior to the government’s official announcement.47 Incensed, government
officials established a royal commission to ferret out the leak’s source. In
response, the Evening Post’s editor, E.T. Gillon, called the commission a
“gargantuan farce,” an “impudent travesty of justice,” and a “political
fraud.”48 He refused to appear after being subpoenaed, calling the duty to
maintain confidential sources “absolutely sacred.”49
More than a century later, the instinct to protect confidential sources
has largely endured. These days, New Zealand consistently ranks among the
most free and open societies in the world. In 2007, the nonprofit media
advocacy and support organization Reporters sans Frontières (a.k.a.
Reporters Without Borders) ranked New Zealand 15th out of 169 nations.50
This placement was higher than the United States (ranked 48th),51 Australia
44

The Sunday Star-Times divulged Prime Minister Clark’s role in the affair, see List, supra note 18.
GUY SCHOLEFIELD, NEWSPAPERS IN NEW ZEALAND 4 (A. H. & A. W. Reed 1958).
46
PATRICK DAY, THE MAKING OF THE NEW ZEALAND PRESS 12 (Victoria University Press 1990). In
one case, the government sought disclosure of the identity of a scathing editorial’s author by ordering the
registrar of the Supreme Court to obtain the original manuscript from the printer of the New Zealand
Herald and Auckland Gazette. See KARL DU FRESNE, THE RIGHT TO KNOW: NEWS MEDIA FREEDOM IN
NEW ZEALAND 9 (Newspapers Publishers Association 2006). When the printer handed over the
manuscript, the editor of the paper challenged the registrar to a duel—an offer that was graciously rebuffed.
Id.
47
DU FRESNE, supra note 46, at 11.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, WORLDWIDE PRESS FREEDOM INDEX,
2007.
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24025 (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
51
Id. A year earlier, Reporters Without Borders commented on the Bush Administration: “The
United States (53rd) has fallen nine places [in freedom-of-the-press rank] since last year, after being in 17th
position in the first year of the Index, in 2002. Relations between the media and the Bush administration
sharply deteriorated after the president used the pretext of ‘national security’ to regard as suspicious any
journalist who questioned his ‘war on terrorism.’ The zeal of federal courts which, unlike those in 33 US
states, refuse to recognize the media’s right not to reveal its sources, even threatens journalists whose
45
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(ranked 28th), and other democratic nations with long traditions of vibrant
media. 52 Moreover, in 2007, the nonprofit organization Freedom House
ranked New Zealand’s press as “free,” its highest mark.53 Insiders agree
with these assessments. Karl du Fresne, author of The Right to Know: News
Media Freedom in New Zealand, states, “In New Zealand, the news media
enjoy a degree of freedom shared by few other countries.”54
Some prescient observers, however, have recognized the need for
vigilance. Historically, press protections have been fragile rights easily
slapped down by government or the courts. As Du Fresne notes, press
freedoms “can be eroded by inches and degrees” and “[f]reedoms that are
taken for granted are freedoms at risk.” 55 In 2006, Freedom House, in
discussing New Zealand, cautioned that “although democratic traditions
have been strengthened in recent years by reforms such as the Official
Information Act and Bill of Rights Act, there are still concerns that these
rights remain relatively fragile.”56
In the realm of confidential sources, it is becoming “reasonably
common” in New Zealand for litigants to seek disclosure from journalists to
bolster evidentiary offerings. 57 More troubling than parties seeking
information, however, has been the response of some courts. “Numerous
courts and tribunals have the power to compel production of documents and
to issue subpoenae. Many of them are exercising these powers in respect of
journalists, and are doing so reasonably regularly.”58
The increased willingness of courts to order the disclosure of
confidential sources may help explain the passage of § 68, but it remains to
be seen whether the new law will provide any additional protection.
investigations have no connection at all with terrorism.” See REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, WORLDWIDE
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19388 (last visited Nov. 21,
2008). The United States ticked back up to 48th in 2007 due to the release of Josh Wolf, a freelance
journalist and blogger who had been imprisoned for 224 days for refusing to turn over his outtakes.
However, Sudanese cameraman Sami al-Haj, who works for the pan-Arab broadcaster Al-Jazeera, has been
held without trial since June 2002 at the US military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See REPORTERS
WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 50. The drastic drop in press freedoms during the Bush Administration’s
“national security” fetish sends a clear message regarding the fragility of press freedoms.
52
REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 50.
53
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
FREEDOM
OF
THE
PRESS,
2007,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2007 (select New Zealand from the pulldown menu) (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
54
DU FRESNE, supra note 46, at 3.
55
Id. at 1.
56
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
FREEDOM
OF
THE
PRESS,
2006,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2006 (select New Zealand from the pulldown menu) (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
57
Gray, supra note 29, at 444.
58
Id.
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ALTHOUGH § 68 CODIFIES NEW PROTECTIONS FOR JOURNALISTS
THEIR SOURCES, IT CONTAINS SEVERAL SHORTCOMINGS

AND

The New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 (“Act”) draws common law and
statutory authority into a single cohesive unit.59 Before passage of the Act,
evidence law was largely the product of common law, “comprising decisions
made by judges in response to the particular set of facts before the court.”60
Parliament enacted only a few “piecemeal” statutory reforms as needed.61
“The resulting complexity and inconsistency of the law of evidence
result[ed] in undue legal argument, expense, and delays . . . ”62
Section 68 is best understood as part of the Act’s “comprehensive
scheme” of evidentiary rules. 63 Until passage of the Act, New Zealand
courts had not established a coherent policy for handling protection of
journalists’ sources. 64 One commentator described New Zealand’s
protections for confidential sources as follows: “[t]here are a number of
overlapping rules that might apply depending on the circumstances, but
ultimately the discretion is with the court to compel disclosure or not.”65
The Act, including § 68, sought to correct these ambiguities in the
application of the law.
Section 68 replaces common law principles with statutory rules, but
reserves significant discretion for the judiciary. So, while § 68 codifies a
privilege for journalists and their sources, it also permits the same brand of
judicial inconsistency the Act sought to correct.
A.

Section 68 Has Strengths That Aid the Free Flow of Information in
New Zealand

At first glance, § 68 seems a boon to reporters by presuming reportersource confidentiality. This presumption makes nondisclosure the default
position, from which the court can move only if the public interest so
demands. The statute’s opening salvo reads:

59

Evidence Bill, 2005, H.R. Bill [256-1], Explanatory Note, General Policy Statement, at 1.
Goff Introduces Evidence Bill, SCOOP INDEPENDENT NEWS, May 3, 2005,
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0505/S00038.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2008) (quoting New Zealand
Government Press Release).
61
Id.
62
Evidence Bill, 2005, H.R. Bill [256-1], Explanatory Note, Current Law and the Bill, at 2.
63
Id. at General Policy Statement.
64
New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 22, ¶ 342.
65
Kelly Buchanan, Freedom of Expression and International Criminal Law: An Analysis of the
Decision to Create a Testimonial Privilege for Journalists, 35 VICTORIA UNIV. OF WELLINGTON L. REV.
609, at 631 (Oct. 2004).
60
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If a journalist has promised an informant not to disclose the
informant’s identity, neither the journalist nor his or her
employer is compellable in a civil or criminal proceeding to
answer any question or produce any document that would
disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to
be discovered.66
This codification shifts the burden of proof from the reporters who, before,
had to convince the court of the need for confidentiality, to the party seeking
disclosure.67 On the surface, this burden-of-proof transfer has the potential
to create sweeping reform in the area of reporter-source confidentiality. The
practical value of this shift, however, remains to be seen. Courts often seem
more amenable to arguments in favor of disclosure than arguments in favor
of confidentiality.
Section 68 also casts a fairly wide net. Namely, the privilege applies
not only to testimony, but also to production of documents that explicitly
disclose the confidant or would “enable that identity to be discovered.”68 It
would make little sense if the party seeking disclosure could simply use the
reporter’s notes as a back-door method of acquiring the identity.69
However, the wide net needs some minor repairs. The operative terms
in § 68(1), as excerpted above, are “would disclose” or “enable [the
informant’s] identity to be discovered.”70 A court could find this language to
be as narrow as, say, the informant’s name, date of birth, or other readily
identifiable characteristic; on the other hand, the language could be broad
enough to swallow any substantive information imparted to the journalist
that a diligent person could use to ferret out the source’s identity. Section 68
sheds little light on whether the actual information imparted to the journalist
is protected along with the identity. The narrow construction seems
particularly susceptible to abuse in whistleblower scenarios where only a
handful of people have access to the disclosed information. If that type of
substantive information is admitted into evidence, the privilege will not
operate effectively.
Accordingly, § 68(1)’s terminology should be more precisely defined,
preferably enumerating all types of journalistic work product (e.g. notes,
outtakes, recordings, and so on) that could be used to identify a source.
66
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Without more, the court could narrowly define the reporter-source privilege,
making it a privilege in name only.
B.

Section 68 Contains Flaws That Undermine the Intent, Application,
and Purpose of the Privilege

Section 68 has not yet been tested by the New Zealand courts. In that
light, the court of first impression should keep in mind three broad
categories in which § 68 is deficient: 1) it is inconsistent with the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; 2) § 68 circumscribes common law
protections; and 3) it has not kept pace with the general environment of press
protections New Zealanders enjoy. The qualified privilege created by § 68
at best improves incrementally on the status quo and, at worst, functions to
impair common law and existing statutory protections. Despite the new
presumption of nondisclosure, in many ways § 68 is also weaker than the
prior privilege regime.
1.

Section 68’s Imprecision Sabotages Iron-Clad Protection, Leaving the
Confidentiality of Journalists’ Sources at the Court’s Discretion

The overarching weakness of § 68 is its malleability.
The
presumption of confidentiality afforded in § 68(1) is all but gutted in the
very next breath. Section 68(2) creates a balancing test that gives the
presiding judge wide latitude to overcome the presumption:
A Judge of the High Court may order that subsection (1) is not
to apply if satisfied by a party to a civil or criminal proceeding
that, having regard to the issues to be determined in that
proceeding, the public interest in the disclosure of evidence of
the identity of the informant outweighs—
(a) any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the
informant or any other person; and
(b) the public interest in the communication of facts and
opinion to the public by the news media and, accordingly also,
in the ability of the news media to access sources of facts.71
By couching the balancing test in broad language without effective fail-safes
placed upon the judiciary, Parliament may have made it less challenging for
judges to order disclosure than at common law. This circumstance exists
because the Evidence Act 2006, in which § 68 is codified, expressly
71
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supersedes the common law. “The Act reflects current developments in
evidence law and takes into account fundamental changes in some areas,”
said Justice Minister Mark Burton.72 “It also clarifies the existing law by
removing ambiguities and inconsistencies.” 73 When § 68 is eventually
tested, the party seeking disclosure will undoubtedly argue that the law
tosses out the old common law protections in favor of the codified and
imprecise balancing test.
Parliament undoubtedly saw § 68’s balancing test as an asset to the
administration of justice. The courts themselves have long expressed an
interest in not being “tied hand and foot” by rigid, forced adherence to press
freedoms.74
It is a point well taken. Journalists should not have an absolute
privilege in all circumstances. Common sense dictates the need for some
limits on free press. In an example birthed by the modern terrorism
environment, if a journalist is truly the only outlet that has information
imperative to preventing imminent harm, a court should be able to compel
disclosure of that information. Accordingly, a balancing test makes good
sense. By definition, balancing tests must have some room to stretch to meet
the circumstances of each case. However, they should not permit a degree
of elasticity that provides room for judges to uphold subpoenas for source
identifying information when free expression in free society dictates that
confidentiality should stand.
Experience with Section 35 of New Zealand’s Evidence Amendment
Act (No. 2) 198075 (“§ 35”) illustrates some problems that can arise from
open-ended balancing tests in the context of confidential sources. The thrust
and language of § 68 is strikingly similar—and indeed may have been
largely inspired by—§ 35. Section 35 creates a balancing test providing
judges with general discretion to excuse any witness from answering
questions or producing documents that would constitute a breach of
confidence.76
Section 35 does not mention journalists specifically, although it
squarely implicates their line of work. Subsection (2) requires the court to
“consider whether or not the public interest in having the evidence disclosed
72
The Evidence Act Was Passed by Parliament Today, SCOOP INDEPENDENT NEWS, Nov. 23, 2006,
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0611/S00465.htm (last visited Sept 10, 2008) (quoting New Zealand
Government Press Release).
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75
See Evidence Amendment Act (No. 2) 1980, 1980 Pub. Act No. 27, § 35 (N.Z.); see also
BURROWS & CHEER, supra note 69, at 565.
76
Evidence Amendment Act (No. 2) 1980, 1980 Pub. Act No. 27, § 35 (N.Z.).
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to the Court is outweighed, in the particular case, by the public interest in the
preservation of confidences between persons . . . .”77 Furthermore, the court
must consider specific factors when balancing the arguments, such as: “(a)
The likely significance of the evidence to the resolution of the issues to be
decided in the proceeding: (b) The nature of the confidence and the special
relationship between the confidant and the witness: (c) The likely effect of
the disclosure on the confidant or any other person.”78 As one New Zealand
media law textbook notes, “[i]t is clear that the power to excuse the witness
[under § 35] is discretionary,” and that power is used only “occasionally” by
the courts.79
In fact, the balancing test in § 35 was recently exploited in the New
Zealand case R v. Patel.80 In this case, Keith Slater, a television reporter for
TV3’s program 60 Minutes, briefly interviewed an anonymous police
informer concerning the murder-for-hire orchestrated by defendant
Bhikubhai Patel. 81 Patel subpoenaed Slater to disclose the interview
contents and the identification of the source. The court, after applying the
balancing test set forth in § 35, in addition to the commitment to free flow of
information inherent to Section 14 of New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act 1990
(“§ 14”), 82 dismissed Slater’s motion to quash the subpoena. 83 Suddenly
facing a live subpoena, Slater faced contempt of court if he did not divulge
his source.
In making its decision, the Patel court eviscerated the simple
balancing test in § 35—a test which, again, closely resembles § 68. Justice
Cooper wrote, “[i]n my view, having regard to the nature of the defence, the
inevitable conclusion is that Mr Slater’s evidence is likely to be highly
significant to the resolution of issues concerning [the informant’s]
credibility, which is plainly a matter to be addressed under s 35(2)(a) of the
Act.”84 With this sentence, the court dispatched the public’s interest in free
expression. In fact, the “inevitability” envisioned by Justice Cooper
conflicts with the rights embedded in § 14, § 35, and New Zealand’s
common law commitment to press protections.
77

Id. § 35(2).
Id. § 35(2)(a)-(c).
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The court offered further ruminations regarding journalists’ ability to
maintain confidentiality when interviewing sources, including this troubling
conundrum:
In a situation where the person providing the information is a
key witness in a prosecution and will of necessity have to give
evidence in a public trial, it could not properly be assumed
either by the witness or the reporter that the content of their
discussions would be able to be kept private.85
This appears to establish, at least in Justice Cooper’s courtroom, that when a
reporter talks to a “key witness” before that witness testifies, the
confidentiality of that conversation cannot be preserved. Because Justice
Cooper applied the balancing test in § 35 to arrive at this decision, the
precedent does not bode well for journalists who rely on the similar
balancing test codified in § 68.
The Patel case exemplifies the need for more robust protections in
New Zealand’s reporter shield law. If Parliament does not reinforce § 68, it
will offer few protections beyond those dismissed by the Patel court under
§ 35. Applying today’s journalists’ privilege, New Zealand courts could
easily reach the same result as the Patel court, with only the added hurdle of
inserting a sentence in the opinion that overcomes § 68’s presumption of
nondisclosure. As Patel demonstrates, judges applying § 68’s balancing test
could prioritize the “public interest” in full evidentiary disclosure at the
expense of source confidentiality and freedom of the press.
Proponents of the balancing test cite another recent case, R v. Cara &
Kelman, 86 as evidence that such tests protect rather than undermine free
speech. In Cara, one of two defendants accused of being an Israeli spy
sought information published by journalists to aid his defense.87 The Cara
court excused three journalists for the New Zealand Herald from giving
evidence, sought under a subpoena, regarding confidential sources.88
The Cara opinion, however, stands as a hollow victory for
confidential source protection. Although the court ultimately did not compel
disclosure under § 14 and § 35, the decision turned on the fact that the
evidence was deemed irrelevant to the case, not because free press trumped
fair trial in a head-to-head confrontation. The court ruled that the party
seeking disclosure was merely engaged in a fishing expedition, “[n]or is the
85
86
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evidence sought directly relevant to the central issue of whether or not the
accused can receive a fair trial.”89 If the information were indeed relevant,
and the court nevertheless held that free press trumped fair trial, then the
ruling would help solidify the importance of journalistic privilege under
§ 35’s balancing test. The Cara court merely sidestepped the conflict by
holding the sought evidence irrelevant.
2.

Section 68 Is Inconsistent with the Common Law Necessity
Requirement, and Neglects to Codify Important Protections Under It

An understanding of New Zealand’s common law as it pertains to § 68
requires a discussion of English common law, from which New Zealand’s
common law derives. New Zealand courts apply English precedent unless
New Zealand courts have distinguished the particular legal issue. Even in
the case of distinguished law, the English common law still carries
persuasive authority.90 New Zealand courts look beyond England, as well,
for persuasive authority. One legal scholar has noted that “New Zealand
courts will consider authorities from a variety of other common law
jurisdictions, especially Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
USA.”91
English common law courts often required a showing of “necessity”
before ordering disclosure of confidential sources or placing restrictions on
the press. Although the “necessity” threshold has waxed and waned over
time, its protection was consistently greater than that provided for by § 68,
which has no such requirement. English courts seem comfortable with a
flexible “degree of need”92 to compel disclosure. One judge 93 wrote: “I
doubt if it is possible to go further than to say that ‘necessary’ has a meaning
that lies somewhere between ‘indispensable’ on the one hand, and ‘useful’ or
‘expedient’ on the other. . . . The nearest paraphrase I can suggest is ‘really
needed.’”94
89

Id. ¶ 42.
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Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights, in The Sunday Times
v. United Kingdom (No. 2), the famous Spycatcher case, held that necessity
“implies the existence of a pressing social need.”95 The Spycatcher cases
revolved around a tell-all book of the same title, written by a former British
spy. The book chronicled MI5’s attempt to discover a Soviet mole. Citing
national security concerns, the British government sought to gag newspapers
from running excerpts of the book, but the newspapers prevailed. Even in
the national security context, the government had not met its burden of proof
on a showing of necessity. These cases illustrate that while the necessity
scale is flexible, it by definition remains within the boundaries of
protectiveness.
In the New Zealand case Cara, supra, the court used its discretion
under § 35 to implement something very similar to a necessity test.96 The
court excluded the evidence because it was “not relevant or essential”97 to
fair trial concerns. However, the court was not guided in that direction by
forceful legislation; it found the evidence unnecessary at its own discretion
and under the impetus of common law.
Under the English common law, a finding of “necessity” was in part a
function of whether the party seeking disclosure had exhausted other means
of obtaining the information before approaching journalists. Often, the
failure to seek other sources of the information could be “a powerful, even a
decisive, factor against the intervention of the court.”98 The necessity test
required parties to exhaust other means of obtaining the desired information
before disclosure was contemplated, resulting in limited and appropriate
instances of compelled disclosure.
The exhaustion requirement is a sensible protection that has relatively
little impact on the administration of justice, yet delivers huge windfalls for
free expression. Other jurisdictions have embraced this exhaust-otheravenues approach. Guidelines established by the United States Department
of Justice, for example, require prosecutors to exhaust reasonable means
before issuing subpoenas to reporters.99 English courts agree. In Ashworth
Hospital Authority v. MGN Ltd., the court held that “in order to demonstrate
that disclosure of a source is necessary, a claimant must show that all other
reasonable means have been employed unsuccessfully to identify the
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source.”100 The case Attorney-General v. Mulholland states explicitly that
“if the information can be obtained elsewhere, it is not relevant or necessary
for [the journalist] to furnish it.”101
While Ashworth and Mulholland speak in firm tones about the need to
exhaust other sources, the leading case from the English judiciary on
journalistic source protection, Saunders v. Punch Ltd., backs off the
requirement: “I do not say that the making of such attempts is a necessary
precondition of the court’s assistance . . . .”102
Section 68, in contrast, remains silent on the need to exhaust. This
deficiency potentially permits parties to engage in so-called fishing
expeditions without first attempting to acquire the information from nonmedia sources. However, a court could find an exhaustion requirement
implicitly exists in the catchall language of § 68(3): “[t]he Judge may make
the order subject to any terms and conditions that the Judge thinks
appropriate.”103 Whether judges will insert an exhaustion requirement into
§ 68(3) remains to be seen.
New Zealand courts might follow the Cara precedent, which birthed
something similar to a necessity requirement from the balancing test in § 35.
The same requirement could be read into § 68’s balancing test. The waters
in this pool are very murky, though, and in the end, journalists seeking to
quash subpoenas will find themselves at the court’s discretion regarding an
exhaustion requirement. At worst, a court could find that the necessity to
seek information from a non-journalist source will not apply, as it is not
expressly enumerated in § 68. After all, the drafters had the opportunity to
include an exhaustion requirement, but chose not to.
3.

Section 68 Does Not Meet the Mandate for Free Expression Found in
§ 14 of New Zealand’s BORA

Similar to England, New Zealand does not have a formal written
constitution. 104 Instead, its constitutional authority is formed through an
amalgam of statutes, treaties, court decisions, and other authority. 105 The
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“BORA”), which spells out the
fundamental rights and freedoms enjoyed by New Zealanders, is one of the
100
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documents afforded constitutional stature. Section 14 of BORA addresses
the free flow of information in society and freedom of the press. It states
simply: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the
right to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in
any form.”106
Section 14 is a powerful legal tool for people working in the news
business. According to one legal scholar and practitioner:
Perhaps the most significant legal change in the last two and a
half decades has been the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990. Section 14 of the Bill of Rights has provided
a new focus for arguments based on freedom of expression, and
has allowed the media to be more assertive, and more
successful, in pressing claims to freedom of expression in the
courts . . . . [P]rior to the 1990s the media did not tend to talk
of a ‘right’ to freedom of speech or expression. Now the courts
are required by statute to act consistently with the right to
freedom of expression.107
As noted in section II.A, supra, the journalistic necessity of cultivating,
utilizing, and maintaining confidential sources is imperative to the free flow
of information. Confidential sources fit within the phrase “information and
opinions of any kind in any form.”108 Accordingly, because § 68 does not
offer robust protections to confidential sources, it is arguably inconsistent
with New Zealand’s BORA. By allowing such wide judicial discretion, § 68
could be construed as failing the guaranteed “right to freedom of expression”
in BORA’s § 14. The shield law should be strengthened to comply with the
broadest interpretation of BORA’s mandate.
From a policy standpoint, the weakness of § 68 also opens the door to
a chilling effect. This reality is inconsistent with § 14’s purpose. To enforce
§ 14’s ideals, the language of § 68 should be read broadly to promote the
relationships between reporters and their sources. The right to “receive”
information, under BORA, should demand nothing less.
Section 25 of BORA establishes robust rights for the accused.
Criminal prosecutions are an area where the confidentiality of sources is
often challenged. Rights of the accused are spelled out in BORA under
Section 25 (“§ 25”).109 Section 14 and § 25 butt heads, almost by definition,
106
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in matters where a party seeks disclosure of a confidential source. In most
cases, only one principle, either free press or fair trial will survive, not both.
As the New Zealand Court of Appeal recognized in Gisborne Herald Co.
Ltd. v. Solicitor-General, “[b]oth values have been affirmed by the Bill of
Rights. . . . Full recognition of both these indispensable elements can
present difficult problems for the Courts to resolve.”110
Despite the equal footing afforded these “indispensable elements,”
judges often use fair-trial justifications to overcome § 14 (and § 35)
arguments. Courts have consistently ruled that free press issues must yield
to fair trial concerns, although BORA makes no hierarchical determination
and certainly does not demand this result.111 A New Zealand scholar noted,
“once it is established that there is a real risk of prejudice to a fair trial,
freedom of expression must be curtailed.”112
Section 25’s dominance seems rooted in the logic of Wigmore’s
enduring—and apparently unshakable—adage that “the public . . . has a
right to every man’s evidence.” 113 In free nations, those facing loss of
liberty typically have the right to present an effective defense. But in New
Zealand, that right is not absolute. It must be balanced against the equally
important right of “[f]reedom of the press as a vehicle for comment on
public issues . . .”114 as Gisborne indicates. More recently, the Cara court
stated that “the Court is here balancing two rights affirmed by the Bill of
Rights which in the circumstances of this case are in competition, the one
with the other, to which the Court must seek a response that is proportionate
and justifiable.”115
4.

Section 68 Invites Conflict Between Free Press and Fair Trial
Interests

In the future, § 68 will likely face the same withering attacks as § 14.
This eventuality is assured by express language in the definition subsection,
§ 68(5): “public interest in the disclosure of evidence includes, in a criminal
hearing by an independent and impartial court . . . (e) The right to be present at the trial and to present a
defence: (f) The right to examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses for the defence under the same conditions as the prosecution”).
110
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proceeding, the defendant’s right to present an effective defence.”116 This
language shoots holes in many arguments journalists could hope to muster
against criminal defendants’ right to a fair trial. This is one of the few issues
the drafters choose to address with great specificity—and for good reason.
The rights protected by § 25 should not be automatically dislocated by New
Zealand’s shield law. The qualified journalists’ privilege must permit some
room for disclosure when justice truly demands.
The bad news for free press is that almost by definition the triers of
fact have more concrete experience with the court system than the media.
Judges have, in a very real sense, devoted their lives to the administration of
justice and an efficient, well-ordered court process. In that vein, when
balancing the “indispensable elements,” judges readily understand the
impact of excluding testimony and evidence when excusing a journalist from
testifying. However, the impact on society for disclosure of confidential
sources is far less intuitive and comprehensible. The New Zealand Law
Commission has recognized that freedom of expression often faces a judicial
handicap:
These potential harms to society are not easy to evaluate in
themselves, let alone to balance against the potential harm
which may be done to the administration of justice if significant
information is not disclosed. Nor can they be readily
demonstrated in a courtroom setting. Judges who administer
justice every day may perhaps be more conscious of costs for
the legal system than broader social costs.117
The damage done to fair trials by maintaining confidential sources is often
overstated and, conversely, the importance of protecting free press interests
is often underestimated. “[P]ublic costs of nondisclosure in terms of lost
information, evidence, opportunities to suppress or punish wrongdoing are
often relatively minimal or illusory,” 118 writes one media law scholar.
“[T]he public interest in protecting [confidential] sources should nearly
always prevail and giving priority to any other public interest should never
be automatic.” 119 A prominent New Zealand media law scholar stated
recently, “[g]iven the statutory protection of freedom of expression in [§ 14]
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, it needs to be considered
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whether, on some occasions, the public interest in discussing an issue should
prevail over the right to a fair trial.”120
While courts should be sensitive to both these competing rights, they
should not so readily dismiss free-press concerns. In fact, the tension at
issue might be more accurately framed not as a conflict between free press
and fair trial, but rather a conflict between fair trial and the public’s right to
know. The distinction is subtle, but revolutionary. After all, media outlets
fulfill their purpose by supplying information to their audience. The press
does not challenge compulsion subpoenas entirely for its own satisfaction;
instead, the press fights to retain confidentiality for the interest of public
access to information. If viewed through these glasses (i.e., the press is an
extension of the public at large) judges might be more willing to maintain
confidences.
5.

Section 68 Does Not Adequately Protect Freedom of Information

Almost fifteen years ago, the New Zealand Law Commission 121
authored a paper weighing the practicality of certain privileges, including a
journalists’ privilege.122 The Commission ultimately found that § 35 did not,
by itself, sufficiently protect journalists. “Although . . . the legislature
appear[s] to have had journalists in mind when [§ 35] was adopted, the
protection which § 35 offers is no longer adequate.” 123 Accordingly, the
Commission recommended modifying § 35 to include protections equivalent
to a qualified journalists’ privilege.124 The proposals contained safeguards to
ensure the untrammeled free flow of information. 125 “With these
amendments. . . a provision equivalent to § 35 in the proposed evidence code
would adequately protect journalists’ sources from compulsory
disclosure.”126 However, § 68’s drafters seem to have ignored many of the
amendments suggested by the Commission, favoring instead the naked
balancing test from § 35. The inference, then, is that without the safeguards,
the Law Commission considers § 68’s current balancing test inadequate.
The following two pitfalls are of particular concern.
120
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First, by creating a blanket balancing test, § 68 fails to “take into
account the nature of the proceeding, such as whether it is criminal or
civil.” 127 Lumping both civil and criminal proceedings under the same
standard shows a troubling and fundamental misunderstanding of the rights
at play. By failing to differentiate between criminal and civil matters, § 68
implies that the same standard applies to both proceedings. However, the
qualified journalists’ privilege should be bifurcated, with separate standards
for civil and criminal matters.
The evidentiary standard in criminal proceedings is more rigorous
than in civil matters. In most cases, New Zealand criminal defendants must
be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, while the standard in civil cases
is typically lower, often more likely than not.128 This division recognizes
that personal liberty in a criminal proceeding is of a different quality than
liability in a civil proceeding.
The opposite should be true for compelled disclosure. While § 68
could be strengthened in general, compelled disclosure in civil matters
where life, liberty, and the public welfare are not at risk should be especially
difficult to obtain. The value to society of protecting the free flow of
information is almost always more important than the particular issues
litigated in civil matters. Criminal matters, however, are more problematic.
The source’s identity should still be appropriately protected, but some
concessions should be made for imminent and dire threats to public or
personal safety.
A single standard cannot be appropriate for both proceedings. The
flexibility of § 68, of course, permits judges to apply different standards to
different proceedings, but it also allows them to abuse that flexibility.
Second, the Law Commission’s paper recommended requiring a lessintrusive method for acquiring the sought-after identity, stating, “alternative
avenues should be exhausted before ordering a journalist to disclose.” 129
Section 68 contains no such requirement. Although § 68(3) states that a
judge can make the disclosure subject to “any terms and conditions that the
Judge thinks appropriate,” it does not mandate using a less-intrusive method
where possible. The less-intrusive method guarantees that parties seeking
disclosure do not use court proceedings merely as fishing expeditions or as
expeditious means of acquiring informants’ identities.
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In addition to § 68’s omission of the Law Commission’s
recommended amendments, a few notable ambiguities in § 68 create
considerable concern. First, it is unclear whether § 68 applies outside the
scope of a “civil or criminal proceeding,” 130 including agency hearings,
military courts and, most importantly, tribunals such as the Broadcasting
Standards Authority (“BSA”). The BSA, an independent crown entity,
operates a “quasi-judicial role of determining complaints” 131 regarding
media broadcasting. Tribunals such as the BSA “hear evidence; their
determinations often affect the rights of the parties before them; [and] they
frequently decide something in the nature of a legal dispute between
parties.”132 Accordingly, § 68’s lack of specificity on this issue could, at
best, create considerable uncertainty regarding the use of a journalists’
privilege in certain trial-like settings and, at worst, preclude its protections.
Second, a court will have to determine who falls under the auspices of
§ 68. The statute declares, “neither the journalist nor his or her employer is
compellable”133 to disclose an informant’s identity. Section 68(5) describes
a journalist as one who “may be given information by an informant.”134 A
narrow reading of this language might preclude, for example, television
news producers and newspaper copy editors. Moreover, § 68 applies only to
those who receive confidences in the “normal course of that person’s
work.”135 A court could determine that bloggers, freelance journalists, or
book authors who only occasionally foray down investigative avenues
should not be afforded § 68’s protections. The threshold question becomes
textual in nature: What is the meaning of “work?” One judge might
determine that, say, unpaid bloggers are “working,” while another might rule
that unpaid bloggers are merely engaging in a hobby. The ambiguity in this
portion of § 68(5) is especially troubling in light of the ease and speed with
which technology creates new mediums for the transmission of information.
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NEW ZEALAND SHOULD LOOK TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS FOR
GUIDANCE, INCLUDING U.S. FEDERAL LAW AND WASHINGTON STATE’S
SHIELD LAW

New Zealand does not have to start from scratch in order to
reasonably strengthen § 68. Two existing sources to which Parliament
should look for guidance include United States federal law and the newly
enacted shield law in Washington State. New Zealand would be well served
by observing not only the protective advantages of the two models, but also
their shortcomings. The state of the U.S. journalists’ privilege should serve
as a cautionary tale for New Zealand legislators, while Washington State’s
law models the appropriate level of protection, codified with assertive,
informative, and unambiguous fail-safes on the courts.
A.

The U.S. Congress Has Not Enacted a Federal Reporter Shield Law,
Leaving the Circuit Courts in Disagreement Regarding the
Boundaries of the Federal Reporter-Source Privilege

The United States lacks a statutory federal journalists’ privilege to
protect against compelled disclosure of confidential sources. Despite
numerous proposed bills, Congress has not passed a shield law.136
From a judicial perspective, in Branzburg v. Hayes a five-member
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a privilege permitting
journalists to conceal confidential sources in a grand jury context.137 Justice
Powell’s “decisive concurrence,” 138 though, “called for a case-by-case
balancing that takes into account press and law enforcement interests.”139 In
light of Justice Powell’s concurrence, some federal circuit courts have read
the majority opinion’s language very narrowly, finding breathing room for a
balancing test outside the grand jury context.
For example, in the 1981 case Zerilli v. Smith, 140 the D.C. Circuit
found that “in the ordinary case the civil litigant’s interest in disclosure
should yield to the journalist’s privilege.”141 The Zerilli court also held that
“a qualified privilege would be available in some circumstances even where
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a reporter is called before a grand jury to testify.”142 However, in the 2003
case McKevitt v. Pallasch, 143 the Seventh Circuit reverted back to the
narrower majority viewpoint in Branzburg, declaring that journalists relying
on a privilege “may be skating on thin ice.”144 The chaos among the circuits
is not limited to Zerilli and McKevitt. The spectrum of protection fluctuates
wildly, from relatively high in the Second and Ninth Circuits to completely
unprotective in the Sixth Circuit.145
The Branzburg decision has led to a degree of uncertainty and lack of
uniformity among the circuit courts. New Zealand risks a similar confusion
with the vague balancing test of § 68. The language of § 68, as it now
stands, permits New Zealand courts in various jurisdictions to establish
disparate precedents.
In an attempt to offer some coherence to the reporter-source privilege,
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) established internal guidelines
directing that “the prosecutorial power of the government should not be used
in such a way that it impairs a reporter’s responsibility to cover as broadly as
possible controversial public issues.”146 One commentator has remarked that
the guidelines “arguably serve as a shadow federal shield law.”147 In fact,
the DOJ guidelines provide for a balancing test very similar to New
Zealand’s § 68. Subsection (a) reads:
In determining whether to request issuance of a subpoena to a
member of the news media, or for telephone toll records of any
member of the news media, the approach in every case must be
to strike the proper balance between the public’s interest in the
free dissemination of ideas and information and the public's
interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration
of justice.148
Recently, though, these protections failed to protect reporters Judith Miller
and Matt Cooper from being held in contempt of court for refusing to reveal
the identity of a source.149 As former U.S. Solicitor General Ted Olson has
142
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noted, “the Justice Department has had internal standards providing
protection to journalists and their sources for 35 years, and Special Counsel
Patrick J. Fitzgerald claimed to be adhering to those standards when he
subpoenaed reporters in the Plame affair.”150
Miller, in particular, felt the pain of reporting in an environment that
has no strong protections for the free flow of information. She spent 85 days
behind bars for conversations she had with top Bush Administration
officials, most notably I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, regarding the identity of
CIA covert operative Valerie Plame.151 Miller was released only when Libby
authorized her to disclose his identity. 152 Miller later testified before the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, citing an “urgent need” for a federal
reporter shield law.153
The federal status quo should serve as a caution signal to New
Zealand lawmakers. Journalists should not go to jail for informing the
public of matters important to democratic governance. The Miller fiasco is
relevant because the DOJ guidelines are more stringent than § 68, including
requiring reasonable attempts to locate the informant before haling the
journalist into court,154 mandating attempts at negotiations before seeking a
subpoena, 155 getting express authorization of the U.S. attorney general, 156
and others. Still, they still did not protect Miller from serving jail time.
B.

Washington State’s Shield Law Strikes an Appropriate Balance
Between the Public’s Competing Interests in Disclosure and
Confidentiality

In the absence of a coherent federal shield law in the United States,
almost every state has recognized the need for a journalists’ privilege.
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Thirty-two states now have codified shield statutes; 157 another seventeen
have some level of common law protections.158
One of the most recent state shield laws is also one of the strongest.
The Washington State shield law is an example of a forceful, effective
privilege that harmonizes the public’s interest in confidentiality and the
public’s interest in disclosure. In the wake of the Judith Miller fiasco,
Washington Attorney General Rob McKenna felt compelled to prevent a
similar chain of events at the state level.159
Washington’s shield law, 160 which went into effect July 22, 2007,
creates an absolute privilege against compelled disclosure of the identity of
confidential sources. 161 Whether the privilege is invoked in a civil or
criminal proceeding, journalists are never required to turn over the “identity
of a source of any news or information or any information that would tend to
identify the source” in Washington State. 162 This clause helps rank the
Washington law among the most protective shields in the nation.163
The statute also creates a qualified privilege for notes and other
outtakes. 164 While not an absolute privilege, the qualified privilege
recognizes that evidence and other information needs to be disclosed only in
situations of compelling public interest.165
Washington’s shield law has all the grit that New Zealand’s § 68 lacks.
It provides standards that guide courts down an established and well-tended
path, allowing for consistent enforcement. Namely, it establishes standards
that recognize the free flow of information in Washington. For example, on
a micro level, the disclosure of information must be “highly material and
relevant” 166 and “critical or necessary” 167 to the party’s claim before
compelled disclosure is even contemplated.
On a macro level, a
“compelling public interest”168 must exist in the disclosure. Furthermore,
the party seeking disclosure must have “exhausted all reasonable and
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available means” before subpoenaing journalists. 169 Importantly, the law
also has expansive definitions of news media 170 and does not require a
formalized promise between source and reporter; a “reasonable expectation
of confidentiality” is enough.171
The first test of Washington’s shield law was an apparent victory for
the protection of confidential sources. On November 28, 2007, Seattle City
Attorney Tom Carr subpoenaed three Seattle Times reporters to turn over the
identity of a source that had given the reporters information about a former
Seattle police officer.172 The officer, John Powers, sued the Seattle Police
Department for wrongful termination and defamation following an alleged
brutality incident. Carr, in defending the city, sought the subpoenas to
discover what information the journalists could furnish.173
Carr, who may have been unaware of the shield, withdrew the request
outright after the Seattle Times’ attorneys filed a document explaining the
steep hill Carr had to climb to get the sources.174 In the court brief, which
supported the motion for a protective order against the subpoenas, the
Seattle Times argued that “the new shield law flatly bars any order
compelling disclosure of information relating to the identity of a confidential
source, for which there is an absolute privilege.”175 The brief went on to
argue that for any “other news and information” the Seattle City Attorney
failed to meet the high bar.176 Namely, the subpoenas failed to persuade that
the sought-after material was “highly material and relevant to its defense;”177
that the reporters’ testimony was “critical or necessary;” 178 that the city
“exhausted all reasonable and available means to obtain testimony from
alternative sources;”179 and that no “compelling [public] interest in forcing
non-party reporters to divulge their sources” existed.180
The shield law’s author, attorney Bruce E.H. Johnson of Davis Wright
Tremaine, explained as follows: In Washington, reporters “really do have
169
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the ability to promise confidentiality, as opposed to only promising
confidentiality until they get tired of sitting in prison.”181
V.

PARLIAMENT SHOULD TOUGHEN § 68 OF THE NEW ZEALAND EVIDENCE
ACT 2006 TO BETTER PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

New Zealand’s Parliament should tighten § 68 to hem in the
discretion of the nation’s courts. Stronger protections would give the shield
law the backbone necessary to ward off a chilling effect and comfort
confidential sources. Otherwise, § 68 will all but maintain the status quo of
New Zealand’s no “coherent policy,” 182 allowing courts to perform very
much the same nebulous analysis as before. Four suggestions follow:
First, the term “outweighs,” in § 68(2), requires a mere preponderance
of public interest in disclosure to justify compelling journalists to reveal
their sources.183 Said another way, if the judge feels the scales tip ever so
slightly in favor of disclosure (say, fifty-one percent) then the judge should,
by statute, order the disclosure. If Parliament enforced a standard of
compelling public interest in the disclosure, instead of merely “outweighs,”
courts would have less opportunity to compel disclosure. The standard of
compelling public interest would be more in line with New Zealand’s
historical commitment to media freedoms and the language in BORA. The
term “outweighs” permits wide latitude for judges to compel disclosure.
Second, the party seeking compulsion should have to prove the
interest in disclosure by clear and convincing evidence. As it stands now
under § 68, the judge need only be “satisfied” in the disclosure.184 New
Zealand courts have long recognized the clear and convincing standard in
the realm of prior restraints, which are also under the purview of BORA’s
§ 14.185 Why not create consistency by recognizing the same standard for
confidential source protection? The clear and convincing standard, which
has been embraced by Washington State in its shield law, would set the bar
high enough to guarantee that parties would not routinely seek subpoenas
without good cause.
Third, § 68 should ensure that the disclosure be highly material and
relevant. This language would preclude most fishing expeditions. The Patel
case serves a cautionary tale of the types of information that can be
181
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compelled under § 68’s lax standard. The court ultimately compelled
disclosure in that case to prove the character of a witness, arguably
stretching its discretion. The character of a witness typically would not meet
the standard of highly material and relevant, and it certainly should not be
good enough reason to risk a chilling effect on the free flow of information.
Fourth, by forcing journalists to expressly promise confidentiality in
their conversations with sources, § 68(1) sets a very high threshold.186 In
New Zealand, the shield will not apply without a formal promise. However,
reporters and their sources rarely communicate in such legalistic formalities.
Particularly regarding sensitive issues, the parties may communicate via
innuendo, inference, and body signals that, while unmistakable in context,
might not satisfy the legal criterion in § 68(1). As an illustration, it does not
appear that Prime Minister Clark and the Sunday Star-Times established the
requisite promise. Despite Prime Minister Clark’s belief that she was
communicating confidentially, 187 her identity and conversations with the
journalist would almost certainly have to be admitted into evidence as the
reporter-source confidentiality was not formally guaranteed. Additionally,
New Zealand contract law already offers a remedy for breach of confidence
when formal promises are in play, making the requirement of a formal
promise superfluous. As one celebrated New Zealand media law scholar has
noted, “[o]ne class of case gives rise to no problem: where two parties are in
a contractual relationship and expressly agree that information supplied by
the one to the other is to be treated as confidential, that contractual
undertaking can be enforced by all the ordinary contractual remedies.”188
Upgrading the law to include merely a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality, as recognized in Washington State, would offer a sensible
level of protection. The formality of an express promise is inconsistent with
strong press freedoms and encourages a chilling effect on cooperation with
the press.
VI.

CONCLUSION

By inserting § 68 into its Evidence Act 2006, New Zealand made a
laudable first attempt at protecting reporter-source confidentiality and, by
extension, the public’s right to know. The presumption of nondisclosure
codified in the statute takes an assertive step toward promoting the free flow
of information. However, § 68 falls short in other regards. Although the
186
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shield law creates a presumption of nondisclosure, it is a presumption too
easily overcome. To come into line with New Zealand’s statutory
framework, its long-standing commitment to press freedoms, and to promote
the free flow of information, § 68 should be fortified with models from other
democratic jurisdictions.

